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The EU-MENA partnership: time for a reset 
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The storm raging across the Southern 
Neighbourhood, as the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region is also known in 
European terminology, is not about to subside 
any time soon. Beyond crisis management, 
current dysfunctions need a long-term, 
sustained and transformative approach. That 
was the spirit of the Barcelona Declaration and 
the original concept of the European 
neighbourhood policy. Obviously, it didn’t 
work as expected. The question is why, and 
how to put the train back on the tracks.     
 
The currently crumbling regional order is the 
result of the dismantlement of the Ottoman 
empire by France and Britain, and to some extent 
Italy, after WWI, and their subsequent  colonial 
empire-building.  After WWII, energy and Cold 
War rivalries, with the US and USSR entering the 
fray, added another layer of confrontation, the 
background against which Arab nationalisms 
developed. Alignment with respective patrons 
was more important than good governance. 
Countries in the region also became juicy markets 
for weapons sales, creating long-term challenges 
for arms control.  
During periods of transition, the  kind of  which we are 
witnessing in the MENA region, geography and history 
come back with a vengeance. Centuries-old narratives are 
resurrected to motivate players’ behaviour.  Outside 
powers continue to suffer from a lack of understanding of 
social and cultural dynamics in the region. Too often, they 
are inspired by a patronising attitude that distorts their 
narratives and policies.  
 
The MENA region has for centuries had an influence on 
European culture and politics. The populations of the 
region are not only Arabs, but also Kurds, Jews, Turks, 
Assyrians, Persians, Berbers, etc. They speak a variety of 
languages. Islam is not the only religion, and many 
religious minorities continue to thrive and participate in 
the political life of their countries. The Levant is the 
birthplace of the three monotheistic religions. Christianity 
was brought to Europe by “migrants” from the Holy 
Land.   
   
The Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf remain a bridge 
between the Atlantic and Eurasia (as well as Africa). If only 
for this reason, it deserves immediate and sustained 
attention, as it threatens to become a black hole in the 
globalizing  world, isolating Western Europe to the 
periphery of the Eurasian landmass, while the trend in the 









The last decade has been dominated by the “Arab 
Springs”. Citizens across the region consistently say the 
most common problems they face are low income, poor 
job prospects, government corruption, declining state 
services, and abuse of power by the elites. A frequent 
criticism of the Western and European approaches and of 
assistance programmes by civil society in the region has 
been that they did nothing to change the status quo (or 
worsened the situation through failed military 
interventions or lack of planning for reconstruction). So 
people decided to take the matter into their own hands. 
Fear made way for courage, and power was in the street. 
Who will ultimately pick it up remains to be seen.   
 
These revolutions have paved the way for the return of 
Russia to the region, eager to reaffirm its status as a great 
power, including by encircling NATO on its Southern 
flank and by promoting its economic and energy interests. 
They have also facilitated the rise of a neo-ottoman 
Turkey and underlined Iranian regional ambitions, 
opening the door to a regional proxy war between Iran 
and Arab powers led by the Arab Gulf countries. (Which 
enjoy the support of Israel, which regularly strikes Iranian 
targets in Syria and elsewhere).  They reflect the impact of 
globalization and climate change. We have witnessed 
escalation all over, and continued interconnection 
between issues. This is not limited to the region, and global 
instability continues to fuel regional conflicts and to be 
fuelled by them. The emergence of non-state actors such 
the Islamic State has created further instability in and 
beyond the region and new threats for a stable regional 
order. Now the pandemic is adding another layer of 
challenges to conflict resolution, and has a serious impact 
on the price of oil and gas. The lines of the Middle East 
are once again re-drawn and the intersection of conflicts 
accentuated and complexified.  
 
Turkey’s hiring of Syrian militia, including jihadists, to fight 
its proxy wars in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as 
its aggressive behaviour in the eastern Mediterranean, 
have upset its allies in NATO (the NATO Secretary-
General expressed his concern about his organisation’s 
“Turkish problem”, especially concerning the activation 
of Russian-delivered S-400). Qatar and Turkey are united 
around a common vision of Islam embodied by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and have developed strong military 
and economic cooperation, further enhancing Erdogan’s 
vision of a prominent place for Turkey in any future 
regional order.        
 
WINDS OF CHANGE? 
Recent moves by the UAE and Bahrain to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel, with Sudan and Morocco 
now going the same way, possibly followed by other Arab 
Gulf  countries, could be potential game-changers.  
Informal relations (economic, intelligence) have been 
going on for some time, but normalization with Israel is 
motivated by several reasons: concerns about the 
progressive retreat of the US from the region (initiated 
during the Obama administration) and the potential 
impact on national security – essentially the Iranian threat, 
and less strategic attention for the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict – concerns that are shared by Israel.  
 
There have also been windfalls recently, related to access 
to US advanced weaponry (F-35 and  other); economic 
modernization away from exclusive reliance on oil and 
gas, including through benefits from Israeli tech; debt 
relief and international assistance for Sudan, after the US 
removed Khartoum  from its list of state-sponsors of 
terrorism; US recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over 
the Western Sahara;  alternatives to China’s ambitions. 
Ahead of the US presidential elections, Trump wanted 
diplomatic achievements to burnish his record. Even if 
these moves didn’t change the outcome of the presidential 
election, the Biden administration will not reverse them. 
Finally, the reconciliation process within the GCC, ending 
the boycott of Qatar (which started in 2017), constitutes 
another signal of changing priorities. 
 
AN AGENDA FOR ACTION?   
As far as concrete areas of focus and opportunities are 
concerned, in a perspective of stabilization and 
cooperation, one should start with current moves to 
reduce tensions or resolve individual and local  conflicts, 
including through UN or international mediation, in order 
 
 





to facilitate progress towards the goal. Then one should 
widen the scope of understandings and involve other 
interested parties and ultimately include the parameters of 
individual agreements into a body of principles applicable 
in other similar situations, underlining the commonality of 
interests.  
 
Several policy-makers and academics, including Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov, have outlined 
concepts for a Gulf security architecture referring to the 
Helsinki process and the OSCE system. Iranian Foreign 
Minister Zarif often reminds audiences of the call for post-
war arrangements included in UNSC resolution 598 after 
the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Other ideas have been put 
on the table recently: the Hormuz Peace Endeavour 
(HOPE) by Iran, a collective security concept for the 
Persian gulf area by Russia, a Middle East Strategic 
Alliance by the US. One could also find inspiration in the 
Madrid conference after the first Gulf War in 1991 and 
the multilateral process it launched, provided the same 
leadership could be mustered today among big powers.  
 
Among ongoing processes: discrete talks between UAE 
and Iranian officials about  the security of navigation in the 
Gulf; discrete rapprochement towards dialogue between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran at track-2 level;  
European/Russian/Chinese efforts to salvage the 
JCPOA and move beyond the nuclear issue;  outreach by 
the Iranian Foreign Minister to Gulf countries; supporting 
an effective transition in Sudan with AU mediation; 
support of peaceful transition in Algeria; consolidating the 
democratic process in Tunisia; complementing maritime 
protection operations in the Gulf with an early warning 
mechanism (that should include Russia and Israel ). The 
future of EMASoH (European Maritime Awareness in 
the Strait of Hormuz) is not clear. European maritime 
operation Irini, monitoring the implementation of the 
arms embargo on Libya, is a good template for post-
conflict mechanisms of enforcement. 
 
Thematic issues offer opportunities to engage in positive 
and innovative approaches, far from zero-sum games.  
 
Security: friendship does not need to exist prior to 
agreeing on security arrangements, as demonstrated 
during the Cold War (“make peace, not love”). 
Cooperation and integration between former enemies are 
essential ingredients to create lasting peace. The European 
Union is a peace project above all. Arms control regimes 
should take precedence in a region which is the biggest 
buyer of weapons per capita in the world, the main 
providers being the permanent members of the UNSC 
and Germany.   
 
Energy: one could think of the recent creation of the 
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, based in Cairo and 
including Israel, as a good example of alternative, 
regionally owned organizations, in association with 
external partners, sharing common interests. The 
exclusion of Turkey, though, has created new tensions 
over Cyprus. The US has shown interest to be part of the 
mechanism. Its status as first oil and gas producer in the 
world offers a plausible explanation. 
 
Global Health: the COVID pandemic had 
demonstrated once again that health issues can be drivers 
of conflict, and  the urgent need for better international 
cooperation.   
 
TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC 
No regional order will be sustainable if local players, 
countries and people do not take ownership. Egyptian 
mediation in the Libyan conflict, and Qatari hosting of the 
reconciliation talks between the Afghan government and 
the Taliban are two recent and encouraging examples.  
 
Methodological approaches should include all 
stakeholders. Not only governments, but also sub-state 
entities, such as provinces or cities, civil society, including 
business, women and youth. Cross-border networks 
should be encouraged along with people-to-people 
exchanges. Digital technologies should be widely used. 
International assistance has to be designed by its 
beneficiaries first, on the basis of local initiatives, with 
emphasis on capacity-building and resilience: it would be 
cheaper and more effective. The role of donors is to create 
 
 





the space for these initiatives to flourish. Dialogue and 
cooperation should happen at all levels simultaneously to 
design policy advice for decision-makers: track 1 and 2 as 
well as civil society initiatives could usefully widen the 
awareness of converging interests and bring practical 
experience to the fore, contributing to a more 
comprehensive and robust policy advice. The cumulative 
effect of addressing interrelated issues in parallel rather 
than consecutive sequences should be considered. 
 
CONCLUSION:THE EU 
Finally, Europe’s strategic absence in managing the crises 
and offering exit strategies has to be addressed as a matter 
of urgency, especially given US disengagement from the 
region (which will not go away under the Biden 
presidency). Increasing great power competition, in 
transactional mode, far from European ideals of 
multilateralism, is another cause for urgency.  
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy for the South is 
globally a failure. Even if original intentions were in the 
right place, the tools and the monitoring of processes have 
been deficient. The lack of understanding of social 
dynamics in partner countries, especially in times of 
transition, and insufficient or ineffective attention for the 
strategic designs of other actors are the main causes of this 
outcome. Divisions among EU Member States (see for 
instance France and Italy over Libya) and narrowly 
defined national interests (such as arms sales) breed 
ineffective and incoherent policies. There is no need to 
invent a new European design. The Barcelona declaration 
of November 1995 has not aged a bit. Only the 
bureaucratic process that followed has. And the political 
will behind it has almost died.  
 
Leadership in Europe is of the essence for leadership of 
Europe in the world, including in the Middle East.  The 
transition at the head of the European institutions, 
including the promise of a “Geopolitical Commission”, is 
a unique opportunity to advance a strategic agenda for a 
more self-reliant Europe and to push for a new world 
order, including a stable and prosperous Middle East, in 
accordance with European values and interests.  
 
Convincing the US of the value of a recalibrated 
transatlantic partnership for the Middle East and engaging 
efficiently with Russia and China, in view of the increasing 
geo-centrality of Eurasia, on issues such as climate change 
and migration, economy and energy, WMD proliferation, 
terrorism and radicalization, should be part of this 
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